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and as members of the Erie County Council
______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 1-07-00089)
Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin, District Judge
______________
Argued December 15, 2010
BEFORE: SLOVITER, GREENAWAY, JR., and
GREENBERG, Circuit Judges

(Filed: April 13, 2011)
______________
Lawrence M. Otter (argued)
422 Belmont Avenue
P.O. Box 2131
Doylestown, PA 18901-0000
Attorney for appellant
James T. Marnen (argued)
Marnen, Mioduszewski, Bordonaro,
Wagner & Sinnot
516 West Tenth Street
Erie, PA 16502-0000
Attorney for appellees
______________
OPINION OF THE COURT
______________
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.
I.

INTRODUCTION

This matter comes on before this Court in this 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 First Amendment action on plaintiff Daniel T. Galena‟s
appeal from the District Court‟s orders entered on March 5,
2010, vacating a jury‟s verdict in his favor, granting defendant
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Fiore Leone judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), and denying Galena‟s motions
for an award of attorney‟s fees and costs. In his amended
complaint, Galena alleged that Leone, at a time that he was the
chairperson of the Erie County, Pennsylvania, Council, the
County‟s legislative body, violated his First Amendment rights
to free speech and to petition the government by ejecting him
from a Council meeting when Galena attempted to object to the
Council‟s procedure in adopting an ordinance. At the end of a
two-day trial, the jury returned a verdict in Galena‟s favor, and
awarded him $5,000 in compensatory damages, as it found that
Leone intended to suppress Galena‟s speech by reason of
Galena‟s viewpoint or identity when he had Galena ejected from
the meeting. On Leone‟s post-trial motion, however, the Court
vacated the verdict, and granted Leone judgment as a matter of
law, as it held that the evidence was insufficient to support the
liability verdict. The Court also denied Galena‟s motions for
attorney‟s fees and costs. Inasmuch as we agree with the
District Court that the evidence was insufficient to support the
jury‟s finding that Leone‟s actions violated the First Amendment
and section 1983, we will affirm the orders of March 5, 2010.

II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2006 Galena, a resident of Erie County, began
attending meetings of the Erie County Council because of his
interest in government and his desire to observe how the
Council was spending public tax dollars. The Council held
meetings every two weeks and Galena estimates that between
3

early 2006 and March 20, 2007, he attended its meetings at least
once a month.
The Council has adopted an Administrative Code that
provides for the order of business at a typical Council meeting to
be as follows: (1) Pledge of Allegiance; (2) Optional Prayer or
Invocation; (3) Roll Call; (4) Hearing of the Public; (5)
Approval of the Minutes of Previous Meetings; (6) Reports of
County Officials, Committees, or Special Advisory Groups; (7)
Unfinished Business; (8) New Business; and (9) Adjournment.1
The Council permits members of the public to comment on any
subject they wish to address during the Hearing of the Public
portion of the meeting, allowing a speaker who has provided
advance written notice of a desire to speak five minutes and a
speaker who has not provided such advance notice three
minutes. The Council applies the Code to preclude a member of
the public from speaking at any time during a Council meeting
other than during the Hearing of the Public portion of the
meeting.2 The Code provides that the presiding officer may bar
1

There appear to be several repetitions in the pagination of the
appendix. There are two sections of pages labeled 127-130 and
three sections labeled as 131-136. We have renumbered the
appendix to avoid confusion. The second section of pages
labeled 127-136 has become 137-146 and the third section
labeled 131-136 has become 147-152. The total number of
pages in the appendix is 178.
2

The Administrative Code does not state that members of the
public may speak only during the Hearing of the Public portion
of Council meetings, but Leone, who participated in drafting the
4

a member of the public from the meeting if the individual
becomes boisterous or makes offensive, insulting, threatening,
insolent, slanderous, or obscene remarks.
The Council takes up the adoption of ordinances during
the “New Business” portions of meetings in accordance with a
formal procedure in the Code. In this regard, the Code provides
that proposed ordinances be introduced in writing, and, except
for emergency ordinances, which may be adopted sooner, may
be adopted at a meeting held at least one week after the meeting
at which they were introduced. The Code requires that all
ordinances related to the levying of taxes, before being adopted,
are to be read at least once in each of two separate meetings of
the Council.
Galena has spoken during the Hearing of the Public
portion of Council meetings approximately 14 or 15 times,
primarily addressing Erie County‟s expenditure of tax revenues.
Galena testified that when speaking his custom has been to
begin by stating his name and address to the Council, and then
turning to the audience and greeting them by stating, “[G]ood
evening taxpayers.” App. at 26. Next, his custom is to face the
Code, and who by the time of the trial had served on the Council
for 32 years, interprets the Code as imposing such a restriction.
Though Galena does not contend that the Code provides for
public comments other than during the Hearing of the Public, he
contends that, regardless of the Code, members of the public
may make objections under the Sunshine Act, a statute we
discuss below, at times other than during that portion of
meetings.
5

Council and, “more often than not, [he] . . . kind of pan[s] the
seven members of County Council with [his] arm . . . and say[s]
„good evening tax spenders.‟” Id. Galena testified that Leone,
on hearing the latter greeting, often would “grimace and scowl.”
Id. Galena also testified that while he was speaking, Leone
would “more often than not . . . grin, and almost laugh” at his
comments, though he did not react that way when other
members of the public spoke. Id. at 27.
This litigation arose from events at the March 20, 2007
Council meeting. During the Hearing of the Public portion of
that meeting four members of the public addressed the Council:
(1) Gil Rocco criticized the Council for its decision making
process and for breaking the law by passing a ban on smoking in
the county;3 (2) Renee Vendetti accused the Council of wasting
money on trips to Washington D.C. and Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania, and stated that the smoking ban was improper
under Roberts Rules of Order and that those rules must be
followed in the preparation of Council minutes; (3) Kenneth
Francis Simon Przepierski stated that the smoking ban was a
“smoke screen” so that the Council can “fly through agendas
bumping first readings to second readings,” criticized the
Council‟s tax exoneration of certain properties, and stated that
the budget should be trimmed, id. at 141; and (4) Maria Foster
stated that the Council was breaking the law in various ways and
that it allowed the Office of Children and Youth to violate the
3

We have examined the smoking ban ordinance, the Erie
County Smokefree Air Act of 2006, Ordinance Number 178,
2006, and note that it is not a county-wide ban on smoking but
rather applies only in certain places within the County.
6

law even though the agency is under the Council‟s and the Erie
County executive‟s4 jurisdiction. Furthermore, Foster accused
Council members of taking pleasure trips to Washington D.C.
and receiving cash and extra perks. All four persons spoke
without interruption or other incident.
Following the Hearing of the Public, the Council
approved the minutes of the previous meeting and received
reports from various committees and Council members. The
minutes of the meeting recite that Leone then addressed the
public comments regarding the smoking ban and also made the
following statement:
Mr. Leone then addressed Ms.
Vendetti, Ms. Foster and Mr.
Przepierski. Mr. Leone keeps
hearing that Council breaks the
law.
He cautioned these
individuals to be careful when they
tell Council they want to be taken
seriously; because Council should
be taken seriously as well. It seems
that no matter what, some people
cannot be pleased. He recalled a
story his father told him – if you
pass out ten dollar bills, people will
complain that they‟re not twenties,
and he feels his father was probably
right.
This seems to be the
4

The County Executive apparently is the county administrator.
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situation here; no matter what
Council does, it just isn‟t enough.
People think Council Members
should be available 24 hours a day,
doing everything they possibly can.
Although he probably puts in more
time than other members, it is
because Mr. Leone has the time.
He reminded the audience that this
is a part-time job.
Council
Members are legislators, and
Council is getting tired of some of
the issues being brought up. He
again cautioned people to be
careful, because, if necessary,
Council will take the matter to
court.
App. at 144-45.
Next, the Council considered several ordinances. During
this consideration, a Council member made a motion to move a
newly introduced ordinance from the first reading to a second
reading. At that point Galena and Leone had the following
exchange:
Mr. Leone: Next item, second
reading of Ordinance 28, in its
entirety, please.

8

Mr. Smith: Second reading of
Ordinance Number 28, 2007, „Fifth
2007 Public Health Fund Budget
Supplemental Appropriation for
Public Health Preparedness Grant.‟
(Mr. Smith reads ordinance body)
Mrs. Loll:

So moved.

Mr. Mitchell: Second.
Mr. Leone: Moved by Mrs. Loll,
seconded by Mr. Mitchell.
Comments?
Mr. Galena: Mr. Chairman, I have
an objection . . .
Mr. Leone:

(uses gavel)

Mr. Galena: Mr. Chairman, I have
an objection
Mr. Leone:

You‟re out of order.

Mr. Galena: You are in violation .
..
Mr. Leone: I said you‟re out of
order, if you keep it up I‟ll have
you taken out.

9

Mr. Galena: I object. You are in
violation of Pennsylvania Sunshine
Act.
Mr. Leone: Deputy, I want him
taken out of here.
Mr. Galena And Erie County‟s
Administrative Code.
Mr. Leone:
charged.

And I want him

Mr. Galena: You are in violation
of the Pennsylvania Sunshine Act.
Mr. Leone: I want him charged.
Do you hear, that‟s harassment.
You‟re not going to get away . . .
Mr. Galena: I‟m part of the
assembly, I object to your
proceedings.
Mr. Leone: We‟ll file charges
against you.
Mr. Galena: You‟re welcome to
do so.
Id. at 148.

10

A sheriff‟s deputy then escorted Galena from the Council
meeting and the building. Notwithstanding Leone‟s comments
at the meeting, neither Leone nor anyone else filed charges
against Galena. Leone, however, sent Galena a letter stating
that, as chairperson of the Council, it was Leone‟s responsibility
to maintain decorum and preserve order at Council meetings,
and that if Galena disrupted meetings in the future he could be
banned from Council meetings.
On April 30, 2007, Galena initiated this case by filing a
complaint, later amended in March 2008, against Leone and all
of the other members of the Council, principally on account of
the events of March 20, 2007. In his amended complaint Galena
charged that Leone violated his First Amendment rights to speak
at a public meeting and to petition the government for redress of
his grievances. Galena also accused Leone of attempting to
intimidate him by sending the warning letter to which we have
referred. Finally, Galena alleged that the Council‟s procedure at
a February 19, 2008 Council meeting, almost one year after the
March 20, 2007 meeting, violated the Administrative Code and
the Pennsylvania Sunshine Act, 65 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 701 et
seq. (West 2000). Galena predicated the first three counts of his
amended complaint on federal law and the last count on state
law.
On June 12, 2008, the District Court, acting on Galena‟s
motion, dismissed all the defendants from the case with
prejudice except for Leone. On August 15, 2008, Galena
abandoned his claims against Leone except for those under the
First Amendment, and, accordingly, Galena‟s count regarding
the February 19, 2008 meeting no longer could afford the basis
11

for a verdict or judgment in his favor.5 Thus, the allegations in
the case were narrowed considerably from the pleading stage to
the trial stage both with respect to parties and issues.
The parties tried the case to a jury on the First
Amendment issues in August 2009. Galena testified describing
his March 20 confrontation with Leone and explaining the
reasons for his objection on that day. Galena interpreted the
Administrative Code to require that Council members introduce
proposed ordinances to the public by placing them on a Council
meeting agenda and making them available 72 hours before their
first reading. Furthermore, Galena testified that the Council
could not vote on any ordinance until at least seven days elapsed
after the ordinance‟s first reading, unless the ordinance
concerned an emergency. Galena‟s research revealed that
frequently during 2006 and 2007 the Council had not complied
with the prescribed formal procedure for the adoption of
ordinances as it circumvented that procedure by waiving the first
reading of some ordinances and finally voting on them at the
meeting at which they were introduced. According to Galena,
the Council followed this truncated procedure 64 times in 2006
and either 14 or 15 times between January and March in 2007.
Galena considered this practice to be in violation of the
5

Though we are not aware of any precedential officially
reported Pennsylvania state court decision on the point, our
review of the Sunshine Act leads us to believe that the Act
probably does not provide for a damages remedy for its
violation. We, however, do not make a determination on this
point inasmuch as Galena has not made a claim in this case for
damages for a Sunshine Act violation.
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Pennsylvania Sunshine Act because the Council was depriving
the public of its right to review the ordinances -- and thus,
expenditures of county tax dollars -- before the Council voted on
them.
Galena stated that on March 20, 2007, he chose not to
speak during the Hearing of the Public portion of the meeting
and, instead, later attempted to voice his objection to the
Council‟s violation of the prescribed procedures during the New
Business portion of the meeting because he could not predict
prior to that time whether the Council during the New Business
portion of the meeting would move an ordinance from first to
second reading. Galena nevertheless testified that, based on the
Council‟s prior history with respect to the adoption of
ordinances, “there was a good chance that they would move first
readings to second readings” at the March 20 meeting. App. at
34. Galena acknowledged that previously when he had
addressed the Council during the Hearing of the Public portion
of Council meetings, it had permitted him to speak without
incident. During Galena‟s testimony, his attorney played a
video and audio recording of the March 20 incident for the jury.
Leone testified that he had served on the Council for 32
years and had been its chairperson during approximately eight
separate year-long tenures. He also testified that during his 32
years on the Council, the only time that he had had someone
removed from a meeting was when he had Galena removed on
March 20, 2007. Leone stated that he personally was not
acquainted with Galena but knew him through Galena‟s
attendance at Council meetings. Leone also testified that he
13

may have spoken with Galena on one occasion prior to March
20, 2007, about a matter before the Council on which he and
Galena were in agreement. Leone further testified that he bore
no personal animosity toward anyone because of that person‟s
opinions, but he believed that the Code restricted members of
the public to speaking only during the part of the Council
meetings designated for public comment. Leone stated that,
“quite a few times” on prior occasions, he had found Galena‟s
comments to be “on the mark,” although there were also “a few
times that he wasn‟t.” Id. at 73-74.
Leone testified that he did not recognize or understand
the basis for Galena‟s objection at the time that Galena made it
on March 20. Leone stated that when he ruled Galena out of
order he did not know what Galena would say and he would
have removed anyone who interrupted the meeting regardless of
the content of that person‟s speech. Leone also testified that,
although the Council solicitor had not briefed him about his
obligations under the Sunshine Act, the solicitor told him that
the Council was in compliance with the Act. Leone stated that
he was not aware of any Sunshine Act provision that allows any
person to object at any time to a perceived violation of the Act.
The sheriff‟s deputy who had been present at the meeting
testified that during the incident Galena was calm while Leone‟s
demeanor was “pretty animated.” Id. at 56. Joseph Giles, a
Council member who was present on March 20, testified that
Galena‟s objections were not insulting, threatening, insolent,
slanderous, or obscene. Giles, however, also testified that when
he had been chairperson of the Council, if a member of the
audience had spoken at a time other than during the Hearing of
14

the Public portion of the meeting he would have called that
person out of order. Giles also testified that Galena was being
“boisterous,” and that if a member of the public refused to “go
through the normal process in order to record comments,” he
would have acted as Leone did. Id. at 62-63.
At the close of Galena‟s case, Leone moved to dismiss
the amended complaint, arguing that Galena did not provide
evidence that Leone intended to suppress Galena‟s speech based
on Galena‟s viewpoint. The District Court denied the motion
but stated that it might revisit the issue later in the case. As we
have indicated, the jury returned a verdict finding that Leone
violated Galena‟s First Amendment rights by having him
removed from the Council meeting and awarding him $5,000 in
compensatory damages. The jury, however, did not award
punitive damages.
The parties followed the verdict with their post-trial
motions. Leone again moved for judgment as a matter of law,
but this time the District Court granted his motion, finding that
Galena did not adduce legally sufficient evidence that Leone had
suppressed Galena‟s speech because of either an animus toward
him or a disagreement regarding his proposed message. Galena
filed motions for attorney‟s fees and costs, but, in light of the
Court having granted Leone‟s motion for judgment as a matter
of law, it denied Galena‟s motions as moot. 6 Galena filed
6

Unquestionably, inasmuch as the District Court granted Leone
judgment as a matter of law, Galena‟s motions were moot
because the losing party in a section 1983 action is not entitled
to attorney‟s fees and costs. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (providing
15

timely notices of appeal from the Court‟s orders.

III.

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over
Galena‟s First Amendment civil rights claims under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331, 1343(a)(3) and (4) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and had
jurisdiction over Galena‟s state law claim under 28 U.S.C. §
1367. We have jurisdiction on the appeal from the orders of the
District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We exercise plenary review of the District Court‟s grant
of judgment as a matter of law and apply the same standard as
the District Court: the motion “should be granted only if,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, there is no question of material fact for the
jury and any verdict other than the one directed would be
erroneous under the governing law.” Beck v. City of Pittsburgh,
89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted); see also Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp.,
4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that a court may grant
a motion for judgment as a matter of law “only if, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and
giving it the advantage of every fair and reasonable inference,
for attorney‟s fees to the prevailing party); Luria Bros. & Co. v.
Allen, 672 F.2d 347, 357-58 (3d Cir. 1982) (losing party in a
section 1983 case is not entitled to attorney‟s fees). In light of
our disposition of the case, Galena‟s motions remain moot.
16

there is insufficient evidence from which a jury reasonably
could find liability”). “[A] directed verdict is mandated where
the facts and the law will reasonably support only one
conclusion.” McDermott Int‟l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337,
356, 111 S.Ct. 807, 818 (1991).

IV.
A.

DISCUSSION

Issues on Appeal

Galena raises two overarching issues on this appeal.
First, he argues that he presented legally sufficient evidence to
support the jury‟s finding underlying its verdict that Leone acted
with intent to suppress his speech based on his viewpoint and
identity when Leone ejected him from the Council meeting.
Second, Galena contends that the Sunshine Act‟s public
objection provision allowed him to speak at any time during the
Council meeting, and has “direct implications on the First
Amendment rights of a citizen speaker at a government
meeting.” Appellant‟s br. at 22. Galena also objects to the
District Court‟s ruling that Galena waived his Sunshine Act
claims prior to the trial. Id. Galena, in making these arguments,
challenges the Administrative Code insofar as it restricts the
public‟s time to speak to the Hearing of the Public portion of a
meeting. Specifically, Galena believes that the Code does not
allow an adequate alternative method of communication for a
speaker who wishes to object to the Council‟s procedures at a
time other than the Hearing of the Public portion of Council
meetings.
17

B.

The First Amendment and Section 1983

For Galena to succeed in this action he had to satisfy the
section 1983 requirement that a plaintiff show that the defendant
acted under color of state law, and, while so acting, deprived the
plaintiff of his rights under the Constitution or laws of the
United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,
48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 2254-55 (1988). Of course, there is no
doubt that Leone was acting under color of state law when, in
his official capacity as chairperson of the Council, he ordered
the deputy sheriff to escort Galena from the Council meeting.
See Barna v. City of Perth Amboy, 42 F.3d 809, 816 (3d Cir.
1994) (“[A]cts of a state or local employee in her official
capacity will generally be found to have occurred under color of
state law.”). Indeed, Leone does not contend otherwise. Galena
asserts that Leone deprived him of his First Amendment rights
to free speech and to petition the government for redress of his
grievances.7
In our consideration of this case we recognize that,
though the First Amendment‟s protection of freedom of
expression is not inviolate, when a public official excludes a
7

Inasmuch as, for purposes of this case, the tests under the
speech and petition clauses of the First Amendment are the
same, we will discuss the claims together as a single claim. See,
e.g., Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 281 (3d Cir.
2004) (discussing speech and petition clause claims together).
We note that the District Court, without objection, in submitting
the case to the jury also combined the claims under both clauses.
18

citizen from a public meeting, the official must not be acting in
violation of that amendment. See Monteiro v. City of Elizabeth,
436 F.3d 397, 404 (3d Cir. 2006). Therefore, we address the
question of whether Leone, in excluding Galena from the
Council meeting, violated the First Amendment.
C.

Forum Analysis

When a First Amendment free speech challenge arises
from a restriction on speech on government owned or controlled
property, as was the case here, the classification of the forum
determines the contours of the First Amendment rights that a
court recognizes when reviewing the challenged governmental
action. See United States v. Marcavage, 609 F.3d 264, 274 (3d
Cir. 2010) (“The degree of First Amendment protection a
speaker enjoys depends on the type of forum in which his
expressive activity occurred.”); Kreimer v. Bureau of Police of
Morristown, 958 F.2d 1242, 1255 (3d Cir. 1992). We are
concerned here with three categories of public forums: (1) the
traditional public forum; (2) the designated public forum; and
(3) the limited public forum.8

8

There appears to be some inconsistency in federal courts‟
opinions, even those of the Supreme Court, as to whether a
limited public forum is a separate category or a subset of a
designated public forum with a third category of forums being
“nonpublic forums”. Compare Int‟l Soc‟y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678, 112 S.Ct. 2701,
2705 (1992) (“The second category of public property is the
designated public forum, whether of a limited or unlimited
19

Traditional public forums include public streets, parks,
and other public areas traditionally devoted to assembly and
debate. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm‟n v. Forbes, 523 U.S.
666, 677, 118 S.Ct. 1633, 1641 (1998). A government entity
creates a designated public forum when it intentionally
designates property that traditionally has not been regarded as a
public forum for use as a public forum. Christian Legal Soc‟y
Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law v. Martinez,
130 S.Ct. 2971, 2984 n.11 (2010). In both traditional public
forums and designated public forums the government may enact
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on speech, but
any restrictions on the content of speech must be tailored
narrowly to serve a compelling government interest. See
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S.Ct. 1125, 1132 (2009).
character-property that the State has opened for expressive
activity by part or all of the public.”); with Christian Legal
Soc‟y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law v.
Martinez, 130 S.Ct. 2971, 2984 n.11 (2010) (listing limited
public forum as a separate third category and not discussing
nonpublic forums). Recently the Court has used the term
“limited public forum” interchangeably with “nonpublic forum,”
thus suggesting that these categories of forums are the same. See
Martinez, 130 S.Ct. at 2985 (citing Perry Educ. Ass‟n v. Perry
Local Educators‟ Ass‟n, 460 U.S. 37, 49, 103 S.Ct. 948, 957
(1983)); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98,
106, 121 S.Ct. 2093, 2100 (2001). Because the continued
existence vel non of a “nonpublic forum” category has no
bearing in this case, we need not dwell on the possible
distinction between limited public forums and nonpublic
forums.
20

The First Amendment prohibits restrictions based on a speaker‟s
viewpoint in both types of forums. Id.
In contrast to traditional and designated public forums, a
governmental entity creates a limited public forum when it
provides for “a forum that is limited to use by certain groups or
dedicated solely to the discussion of certain subjects.” Id.;
Donovan ex rel. Donovan v. Punxsutawney Area Sch. Bd., 336
F.3d 211, 225 (3d Cir. 2003). In Eichenlaub v. Township of
Indiana, 385 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2004), we were concerned with
restrictions on speech in a limited public forum. There we held
that the citizens‟ forum portion of the Indiana Township Board
of Supervisors meeting was a limited public forum because
“public bodies may confine their meetings to specified subject
matter . . . matters presented at a citizen‟s forum may be limited
to issues germane to town government.” Id. at 281 (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted). In limited public forums,
to avoid infringing on First Amendment rights, the
governmental regulation of speech only need be viewpointneutral and “reasonable in light of the purpose served by the
forum[.]” Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98,
107, 121 S.Ct. 2093, 2100 (2001) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).9

9

We have stated that “we have generally applied to limited
public fora the constitutional requirements applicable to
designated public fora.” Whiteland Woods, L.P. v. Twp. of
West Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177, 182 n.2 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing
Christ‟s Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth.,
148 F.3d 242, 248-55 (3d Cir. 1998)). In light of Pleasant
21

Here, the District Court instructed the jury that the Erie
County Council meeting was a limited public forum. Galena, in
part of his brief, agrees with the limited forum designation but in
another part he argues that the District Court‟s designation of
the Council meeting as a limited public forum was erroneous.10
But, as we discuss in the next section, Galena has waived the
argument that the District Court‟s recognition of the Council
meeting as a limited public forum was erroneous. In any event,
even if he properly had presented and preserved his argument
with respect to the misclassification of the forum so that we
found it necessary to address the argument on its merits, we
would conclude that Galena‟s position would not be meritorious.
It is perfectly clear that the District Court was correct when it
held that the March 20 Council meeting was a limited public
forum inasmuch as the meeting was held for the limited purpose
of governing Erie County and discussing topics related to that
governance. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7, 103 S.Ct. at 955 n.7;
see also Rowe v. City of Cocoa, 358 F.3d 800, 803 (11th Cir.
2004) (per curiam) (“As a limited public forum, a city council
meeting is not open for endless public commentary speech but
instead is simply a limited platform to discuss the topic at
Grove, this statement may no longer be good law.
10

Galena indicates that the District Court‟s “analysis of a
„limited forum‟ is fatally deficient because it considered the
Sunshine Law irrelevant to the proceeding,” but then states that
“Galena‟s right to speak out in this „limited forum‟ on March
20, 2007, is clear from the straight forward prose in the
Pennsylvania Sunshine Law „objection‟ provision.” Appellant‟s
br. at 24, 26.
22

hand.”).
In a limited public forum, such as the Council meeting,
“content-based restraints are permitted, so long as they are
designed to confine the forum to the limited and legitimate
purposes for which it was created.” Eichenlaub, 385 F.3d at 280
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The
government may not “regulat[e] speech when the specific
motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker
is the rationale for the restriction.” Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829, 115 S.Ct. 2510,
2516 (1995). The government, however, may restrict the time,
place and manner of speech, as long as those restrictions are
reasonable and serve the purpose for which the government
created the limited public forum. Pleasant Grove, 129 S.Ct. at
1132. A time, place, and manner restriction on speech is
reasonable if it is (1) content-neutral, (2) narrowly tailored to
serve an important governmental interest, and (3) leaves open
ample alternatives for communication of information. See Ward
v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791-803, 109 S.Ct.
2746, 2753-60 (1989). However, even if a limitation on speech
is a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction, there is a
First Amendment violation if the defendant applied the
restriction because of the speaker‟s viewpoint. See, e.g.,
Monteiro, 436 F.3d at 404. Keeping these principles with
respect to the categorization of public forums in mind, we now
address Galena‟s arguments starting with the Sunshine Act.
D.

The Sunshine Act

The Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted the
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Sunshine Act to “provide citizens with an opportunity to observe
the deliberation, policy formulation and decision-making
processes of public agencies.” Lee Publ‟ns, Inc. v. Dickinson
Sch. of Law, 848 A.2d 178, 180 n.2 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004)
(citing 65 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 702 (West 2000)). The
Sunshine Act requires that: (1) “[o]fficial action and
deliberations by a quorum of the members of an agency. . . take
place at a meeting open to the public11;” (2) “the vote of each
member who actually votes on any . . . ordinance. . . must be
publicly cast . . . ;” (3) minutes be kept of agency meetings; and
(4) public notice be given in advance of the meeting in a manner
directed by the Act. 65 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 704, 705, 706,
709 (West 2000). The “Public participation” section of the Act
states that “[a]ny person has the right to raise an objection at any
time to a perceived violation of [the Sunshine Act] at any
meeting of a board or council of a political subdivision or an
authority created by a political subdivision.” Id. § 710.1(c).
It is a matter of some interest, inasmuch as Galena views
the Sunshine Act as expanding First Amendment rights, that the
Act includes a provision that “[t]he board or council has the
option to accept all public comments at the beginning of the
meeting.” 65 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 710.1(a). The
Administrative Code‟s provision for public comments during the
Hearing of the Public at the outset of the meeting would seem to
be in accordance with that provision as that portion of the
11

Agencies include “any board, council, authority or
commission of the Commonwealth or of any political
subdivision of the Commonwealth . . . .” 65 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
§ 703 (West 2000).
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meeting is the first item on the Council‟s agenda following
formal starting procedures.
Galena argues that section 710.1(c), which allows any
person to raise a contention that there has been a Sunshine Act
violation at any time, pre-empts the Administrative Code‟s
limitation of public comments to the Hearing of the Public
portion of Council meetings and supports his claim that he had a
First Amendment right to object to the Council‟s decision to
move an ordinance immediately from the first reading to the
second reading when he attempted to raise the issue. Moreover,
he believes that the Council was employing a procedure in
violation of the Sunshine Act when, in acting on an ordinance, it
followed the truncated procedure that Galena sought to
challenge. Galena also argues that the Sunshine Act “offers the
key to unlock a limited forum.” Appellant‟s br. at 28. He thus
seems to believe that the Pennsylvania General Assembly can
expand the scope of First Amendment rights beyond the limits
on them that otherwise would exist. Furthermore, Galena
contends that Leone‟s purported ignorance of the Sunshine Act
did not give him an excuse to justify his suppression of Galena‟s
First Amendment rights.
The District Court held that Galena waived the foregoing
Sunshine Act arguments because he did not ask the Court to
submit his contentions to the jury and did not object to the
Court‟s omission of them during its instructions to the jury. The
Court pointed out that even though the amended complaint
contained a count asserting that the Council had committed a
Sunshine Act violation, though on a date other than March 20,
2007, Galena voluntarily moved to dismiss that count before the
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Court sent the case to the jury and the Court did as Galena
asked.12 Moreover, the Court reasoned that, even if the
Sunshine Act claims had been presented properly, they would
not have been legally relevant to Galena‟s First Amendment
claim.
Clearly, the District Court was correct both procedurally
and substantively with respect to the Sunshine Act issues. When
Galena voluntarily waived his Sunshine Act claim prior to trial,
even laying aside the fact that the claim as pleaded did not relate
to the March 20, 2007 events, he removed the issue of the
Council‟s violation of the Act, at least as a basis for the return of
a verdict in his favor, from the jury‟s consideration. Moreover,
as Leone correctly points out, the jury instructions did not
instruct the jury with respect to either the contents of the
Sunshine Act or any legal interpretation of the Act. In fact, at
the outset of its charge the Court told the jury that “[i]t is not
your function in this case to determine whether there was or was
not a violation of the Pennsylvania Sunshine Law and/or any
provision of the Erie County Administrative Code. In other
words, those issues are irrelevant and should play no part in your
deliberation in this case.” Addendum to app. at 2. Galena does
not claim in his brief that he objected to the charge, and we see
no indication in the record that he lodged such objection, and
thus the possible effect of a violation of the Sunshine Act was
taken out of this case.

12

As we have indicated, the Sunshine Act claim related to an
action the Council took at a meeting on February 19, 2008.
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In any event, even though Leone‟s enforcement of the
Code in restricting Galena‟s speech could have raised a question
of the validity of the Code under the Sunshine Act, any question
of whether the Code, as written or applied, was inconsistent with
the Act would have been separate from the question of whether
the Code‟s provisions unreasonably restricted the First
Amendment rights of a member of the public who wanted to
speak at a time other than the Hearing of the Public portion of a
meeting. Thus, even if we held that Leone violated the Sunshine
Act when he had Galena removed from the meeting, our result
would be no different on this appeal in this First Amendment
case. Moreover, Galena does not assert in his brief that in the
District Court he argued that the Code did not comply with the
Sunshine Act and thus the District Court did not determine
whether the Code complied with the Act. Therefore, because
Galena does not now argue that he is entitled to a reinstatement
of the verdict on the discrete basis that there was a Sunshine Act
violation, did not argue in the District Court that the Code did
not comply with the Sunshine Act, and did not object when the
Court instructed the jury not to determine if there had been a
violation of the Sunshine Act, we will not address the question
of whether the Code, as written or applied, is valid under the
Sunshine Act.
Galena also argues that the District Court erred because it
did not factor into its forum analysis the Sunshine Act‟s
provision allowing objections to be made at any time during a
meeting subject to the provisions of the Act, such as the March
20 meeting. In Galena‟s words in his brief, the Sunshine Act
“unlock[ed] a limited forum.” Appellant‟s br. at 28. As we
discussed above, the government‟s intent in creating the forum,
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as well as the extent of the permissible use by the public within
the forum, determines the designation of the type of forum. See
Brody by and Through Sugzdinis v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108, 1117
(3d Cir. 1992). Consequently, a state law could be relevant
when a determination of the designation of a forum is made if
the law opened a meeting to a wider range of public expression
than normally is allowed in a limited public forum. Galena,
however, did not advance this theory on how the Sunshine Act
could have influenced the forum analysis in his proposed jury
instructions. Furthermore, we do not find anything in the record
supporting a conclusion that Galena objected to the District
Court‟s jury instructions when the Court, in instructing the jury,
treated the Council meeting as a limited public forum.
Therefore, Galena has waived his argument that the Court erred
in not factoring in the Sunshine Act into its forum analysis. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(c)(1) (a party waives its objection to jury
instructions unless it objects “stating distinctly the matter
objected to and the grounds of the objection”); Thabault v.
Chait, 541 F.3d 512, 525 (3d Cir. 2008) (applying Fed. R. Civ.
P. 51).
In sum, Galena‟s Sunshine Act arguments were not
presented to the jury in the District Court‟s instructions, and,
inasmuch as Galena did not request the Court to present them in
the instructions and did not object to their not having been
presented, he has not preserved any argument with respect to the
Court not presenting them to the jury so as to justify our
consideration of his Sunshine Act arguments on this appeal.13
13

We are aware that the general rule that a court of appeals does
not consider an issue that was not raised in the district court may
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Further, as the Court noted, the possible questions of whether
Galena had a right to speak under the Sunshine Act and whether
Leone violated the Act by ejecting him from the Council
meeting are distinct from the issues in this First Amendment
case and the Court told the jury not to consider possible
Sunshine Act violations in its deliberations. Moreover, though
Leone‟s actions may have violated the Sunshine Act, such a
violation would not per se infringe on Galena‟s First
Amendment rights because a statute can create free speech
rights under state law beyond those that the First Amendment
recognizes.14
Accordingly, the questions we address on the merits on
this appeal, when taking into account well-established practices
concerning the procedures for advancing and preserving
contentions, are whether Galena‟s viewpoint or identity
motivated Leone when he had Galena removed from the
meeting or whether, in his role as chairperson of the Council, he
was enforcing a reasonable time, manner, and place restriction
in a limited public forum. In fact, the Court instructed the jury
to decide these issues.

be relaxed if “the public interest or justice so warrants,”
Appalachian States Low-Level Radioactive Waste Comm‟n v.
Pena, 126 F.3d 193, 196 (3d Cir. 1997), but we see no reason to
relax the rule here.
14

Of course, we realize that an official action in some
circumstances could violate both the First Amendment and the
Sunshine Act.
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E.

Validity of Time, Place, and Manner Restriction

Our recognition of the limited role of the Sunshine Act
on this appeal takes us to our next inquiry which focuses on
Galena‟s argument under the First Amendment concerning the
validity of the Administrative Code‟s restriction on public
participation. In particular, we consider whether the Code left
Galena with alternative means of communicating the content of
his objection to the Council‟s procedures.15 According to
Galena, he could not have objected during the Hearing of the
Public portion of the Council meeting to the Council‟s
procedures in adopting an ordinance as that portion of the
meeting preceded the New Business portion of the meeting
when the Council considers the adoption of ordinances.
Therefore, Galena contends that the restriction on public
participation did not provide him with an adequate alternative
means of communicating his message concerning the Council‟s
procedure in adopting the ordinance.
Leone responds, and the District Court held, that Galena
waived this argument as well as his Sunshine Act arguments,
inasmuch as the question of whether a regulation leaves open
alternative means of communication is a question of fact that,
15

As we stated earlier, there are two other considerations in
determining whether a restriction is reasonable: (1) whether the
restriction is content neutral, and (2) whether it is narrowly
tailored to serve an important governmental interest. See Ward,
491 U.S. at 791-803, 109 S.Ct. at 2753-60. Inasmuch as Galena
did not properly raise these issues in the District Court, nor does
he raise them on appeal, we will not discuss these two factors.
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without objection by Galena, the Court never presented to the
jury for its consideration. Leone further argues that even if
Galena had not waived the issue, Galena‟s right to voice his
objection during a subsequent Council meeting provided him
with an adequate alternative means to communicate his
message.
Clearly, the District Court‟s ruling was correct on this
waiver issue. The reasonableness of a time, place or manner
restriction on speech presents a question of law but the
determination involves three subsidiary elements: the challenged
restriction must be (1) content-neutral, (2) narrowly tailored to
serve an important governmental interest, and (3) leave open
ample alternatives for communication of information. See
Ward, 491 U.S. at 791-803, 109 S.Ct. at 2753-60. The three
subsidiary elements of the reasonableness question pursuant to
which a court determines the validity of the restriction are
questions of fact which should be submitted to the jury, except
where the evidence applicable to a particular element entitles a
party to judgment as a matter of law on that element. See
McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636, 646 (3d Cir. 2009).
But the only factual question that the District Court told
the jury that it had to resolve in determining whether Leone
violated Galena‟s First Amendment rights in having him ejected
from the March 20 meeting was whether Leone intended to
restrict Galena‟s speech because of its content or his identity, or
whether he intended to enforce a reasonable restriction on the
time, place, and manner of that speech.16 The jury instructions
16

The District Court charged the jury to answer the following
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assumed that the restriction, as the Code is applied, on when a
member of the public may speak at a meeting was reasonable,
and Galena does not point to any place in the record showing
that he requested that the Court give an instruction on adequate
alternative means of communication or at which he objected to
the lack of such an instruction in its charge. In fact, even on this
appeal, Galena does not contend that the jury instructions were
flawed or incomplete.17 To the contrary, he argues that the jury
verdict returned on the instructions should be upheld. We thus
are constrained to treat the Court‟s charge to the jury as having
correctly set forth the law. Furthermore, even aside from the
fact that Galena did not object to how the Court submitted the
case to the jury, he did not move for the Court to hold that the
restriction on his speech was not reasonable as a matter of law,
though he does contend on this appeal that, as a legal matter,
there was not an adequate alternative means of communicating
his message.
questions: (1) whether “in ruling [Galena] out of order and
ordering his removal from the March 20, 2007 meeting of
County Council, [Leone] acted with the intention of imposing
reasonable restrictions on the time, place and manner of
[Galena‟s] speech to preserve order and decorum at the
meeting,” or (2) whether “[Leone] acted with the intention of
suppressing [Galena‟s] speech based on its message or based on
the identity of the speaker.” Addendum to app. at 9-10.
17

In this opinion we make numerous references to the District
Court‟s charge to the jury and observe that in his brief Galena
does not claim to have objected to the charge in any respect.
Indeed, Galena never mentions the Court‟s charge in his brief.
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Although we have focused to a large extent on procedural
issues, as it is appropriate to do, we nevertheless hold that, as a
substantive matter, it is clear from the record that there were
adequate alternative means for Galena to communicate his
objection to the Council‟s procedure in adopting ordinances.
The Supreme Court has required that an alternative means of
communication provide only a “reasonable opportunity” for
communication of the speaker‟s message. See City of Renton v.
Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54, 106 S.Ct. 925, 932
(1986); see also Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1138
(9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Supreme Court generally will not strike
down a governmental action for failure to leave open ample
alternative channels of communication unless the government
enactment will foreclose an entire medium of public expression
across the landscape of particular community or setting.”)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
Galena argues that he would have needed a “crystal ball”
to predict during the Hearing of the Public portion of the March
20 meeting what actions the Council would take following that
portion of the meeting. Appellant‟s br. at 16. Thus, he contends
that he could not be expected to object to something that he did
not know would happen. At the March 20 meeting, however,
another member of the public challenged the Council‟s
procedure of moving ordinances from the first reading to the
second reading, a process he described as “bumping first
readings to second readings.” App. at 141. Moreover, as the
District Court pointed out, Galena had been tracking the number
of times the Council moved an ordinance from the first reading
to the second reading and found that in the 15 months prior to
the March 20 meeting, the Council employed this procedure
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approximately 80 times. Thus, Galena did not need to be a
fortune teller to recognize that the Council might employ this
procedure at the March 20 meeting and to object to the
procedure before it happened. Furthermore, if Galena wanted to
object to the procedure as it related to the specific ordinance
being considered on March 20, 2007, he could have done so at
the Hearing of the Public portion of a subsequent Council
meeting.18
We recognize that Galena may deem that the alternative
opportunities allowing him to object to the Council‟s procedures
before or after the New Business portion of the March 20
meeting were inadequate inasmuch as he may believe that an
objection made at the time the Council is considering a proposed
ordinance is the best time to object to an irregularity in the
Council‟s procedure in considering the adoption of that
ordinance for the objection might lead the Council to change its
procedure with respect to that ordinance. Though we
acknowledge that such a view would not be unreasonable, the
First Amendment does not guarantee a speaker the most
effective means of communication of the his message. Heffron
v. Int‟l Soc‟y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640,
18

We also point out that when the Council took up the adoption
of an ordinance on March 20, it was considering the type of
business that often came before it in the regular course of its
proceedings. Thus, this case does not involve a situation in
which in the New Business portion of the meeting the Council
undertook to deal with a matter completely different from its
usual business, though we do not suggest that if it had done so
our result on this appeal would have been different.
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647, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 2564 (1981) (“[T]he First Amendment
does not guarantee the right to communicate one‟s views at all
times and places or in any manner that may be desired.”);
McTernan, 564 F.3d at 657 (“[T]he First Amendment does not
guarantee a speaker an absolute right to actual conversation with
his audience in every circumstance.”).
Here, as we have indicated, Galena could have delivered
his message to his intended audience at the Hearing of the
Public portion of the March 20 meeting or, if he wished to
address a specific action the Council took after the Hearing of
the Public portion of the March 20 meeting, he could have
conveyed his objection during the Hearing of the Public portion
of the next Council meeting, or, indeed, during any future
Council meeting. Thus, the Hearing of the Public portion of the
Council‟s meetings provided Galena with a reasonable
opportunity to communicate his message to his intended
audience while respecting the Council‟s interest in its meetings
being efficient and orderly. Therefore, even if Galena properly
had raised in the District Court the issue of the adequacy of the
alternative means for him to communicate his objection, we
would find, as a matter of law, that the Administrative Code‟s
restriction of public comments to the Hearing of the Public
portion of the Council‟s meetings did not deprive Galena of
adequate alternative opportunities to convey his views.
F.

Intent to Suppress Speech Based on Viewpoint or
Identity

The District Court determined that Galena did not submit
sufficient evidence to show that Leone acted with intent to
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suppress his speech based on Galena‟s identity or disagreement
with Galena‟s message and the challenge to this determination
gives rise to an overarching issue on the appeal. Galena points
to the following evidence which he believes contradicts the
Court‟s holding: Galena testified that he frequently attended
Council meetings and had been critical of its expenditure of tax
dollars; on prior occasions, Leone scowled, grimaced, grinned or
laughed at his comments during the Hearing of the Public
portion of meetings but did not do so when other speakers made
comments; and the deputy sheriff present at the March 20
meeting, described Galena‟s demeanor during the confrontation
with Leone as calm, and Leone‟s demeanor as “animated.” App.
at 55-56. The videotape of the incident corroborates the deputy
sheriff‟s account of the incident.
The District Court, however, viewed the evidence in light
of other evidence introduced at the trial that was uncontroverted:
namely Leone‟s testimony that he served on the Council for 32
years and was involved in drafting the Administrative Code; he
understood that the Code allowed public participation only
during the Hearing of the Public portion of meetings and was
unaware of a Sunshine Act provision allowing the public to
object at meetings;19 Galena‟s testimony that he spoke at 14 or
19

We do not suggest that Leone‟s ignorance of the provisions of
the Sunshine Act in any way enhances his position on this
appeal for if Leone violated the Act his ignorance of its content
would not excuse his action. But on this appeal it does not
matter whether Leone violated the Act because, for the reasons
we already have set forth, evidence of the violation would not
strengthen Galena‟s position under the First Amendment as a
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15 Council meetings before March 20, 2007, and on every
occasion except for one, he spoke during the Hearing of the
Public portion of the meeting; according to a transcript admitted
into evidence and Leone‟s testimony, Galena spoke during the
business portion of a January 2, 2007 Council meeting and
Leone pounded his gavel and stated “You keep that up, I‟m
going to have you taken out. You had your chance to speak.”
Id. at 111-12, 157; Leone testified that the March 20 incident
was the first occasion in his 32 years on the Council that he had
a member of the public removed from a meeting; and finally,
other members of the public including Galena, frequently spoke
out against the Council and one member of the public addressed
the Council‟s procedure of moving an ordinance from the first
reading to the second reading during the Hearing of the Public
portion of the March 20 meeting without interruption from
Leone or other Council members.
In reviewing this evidence we, like the District Court,
must “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party” and we “may not make credibility determinations or
weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.,
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2110 (2000). Thus,
where a finding of a constitutional violation must be predicated
on a determination that the defendant in suppressing speech
acted with an improper intent and the jury returns a verdict for
the plaintiff, “judgment as a matter of law will be granted to the
defendant only if that verdict is not based on sufficient
violation of the Act is not a per se violation of the First
Amendment and the Act does not expand the First Amendment
rights of members of the public.
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evidence.” Monteiro, 436 F.3d at 406. But a scintilla of
evidence supporting a conclusion that Leone had an improper
motivation when having Galena removed is not sufficient.
Rather, there must be enough “evidence upon which the jury
could properly find a verdict” for Galena for his case to survive
Leone‟s motion for judgment as a matter of law. Lightning
Lube, 4 F.3d at 1166 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).20
The most telling evidence that refutes any reasonable
inference that there was viewpoint discrimination is the manner
in which the March 20 confrontation unfolded. Indeed, that
evidence conclusively establishes that this case simply cannot be
sustained as a First Amendment case based on the restriction of
Galena‟s attempt to state his viewpoint that the Council was
violating the Sunshine Act21 in adopting the ordinance on March
20. At the March 20 meeting, when the Council considered the
ordinance, Galena stated that “I have an objection” after which
Leone banged his gavel. App. at 7. Galena then again stated
that “[I have] an objection” and Leone called Galena out of
order. Id. Galena, undeterred, then stated “You are in violation
20

Of course, our reference to Galena‟s evidence does not signal
that we are weighing that evidence against Leone‟s evidence.
To the contrary, we are describing Galena‟s evidence because it
is necessary to do so in determining whether the evidence
adequately supported the verdict.
21

We realize that Galena also said that Council was violating
the Administrative Code but that allegation adds nothing to this
discussion.
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. . .” at which point, before Galena could finish his sentence,
Leone interrupted and stated that if Galena kept it up he would
have him taken out. Id. Galena objected a third time, and
finally stated that the reason for his objection was that there was
a violation of the Sunshine Act. It was then that Leone ordered
the deputy sheriff to remove Galena. Galena did not state that
the Council was violating the Sunshine Act until after Leone
warned him twice that he was out of order and warned him that
further objections would result in his ejection from the meeting.
Id.
In light of these facts, it is impossible to conclude that
hostility to Galena‟s viewpoint motivated Leone when he
declared Galena out of order and attempted to silence him
because Leone took these actions before he knew the basis for
Galena‟s objection. Indeed, as we explained above, Galena in
his brief acknowledges this point. In fact, Galena relies to a
degree on Leone‟s ignorance of the basis for his objection as he
believes that it was wrong for Leone to act before he knew that
basis.
We recognize, of course, that when Leone ejected Galena
from the meeting he knew why Galena was objecting. But that
knowledge does not affect our analysis for Leone said to Galena
that “if you keep it up I‟ll have you taken out” before Galena
mentioned the Sunshine Act. Id. at 148. The record here
precludes a finding that Leone had Galena removed because
Galena contended that there was a Sunshine Act violation.
We also note that Leone stated that he did not know or
understand the basis for Galena‟s objections when he declared
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Galena out of order and that he would have him taken out of the
meeting without such knowledge.22
Indeed, Galena
acknowledged that Leone declared him out of order before he
specified the basis for his objection and the minutes of the
March 20 meeting confirm that this was so. Thus, this case
cannot be understood as involving a situation in which Leone
reacted to Galena‟s comments because Galena complained to the
Council that there was a Sunshine Act violation.
Overall, it is beyond doubt that Leone restricted Galena‟s
speech because Leone was enforcing the Administrative Code
and not because of Galena‟s reason for objecting. Indeed,
Galena essentially acknowledges this point in his brief in which
he sets forth that he “testified that he did not express the
contents of „my objection‟ because Mr. Leone refused to
recognize the objection.” Appellant‟s br. at 5.
We also point out that even if there had been evidence
that could support a finding that Leone knew the basis for
Galena‟s objection when Leone ruled him out of order, our
result would be the same. The Administrative Code is applied
to limit all comments of the public to the Hearing of the Public
portion of a meeting regardless of whether the proposed
comment relates directly to a matter that the Council then is
addressing. Thus, the restriction on making comments is
divorced entirely from the contents of the comments and
therefore the chairperson‟s determination to enforce the
22

Of course, by the time that the deputy sheriff took Galena out
of the meeting, he had stated the basis for his objection.
40

restriction does not take into account the viewpoint that the
speaker intends to set forth. Accordingly, we would reach the
same result on this appeal even if Galena had initiated his
comments on March 20 by stating that “The Sunshine Act is
being violated.” Though Leone might have been violating the
Sunshine Act if he had Galena ejected for persisting in his
comments, Leone would not have been violating the First
Amendment as enforced through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because
Leone‟s actions would not have been taken to enforce a
viewpoint restriction and Galena still would have had an
adequate alternative means of communication to express his
views.
Notwithstanding the irrefutable record of the March 20
meeting, in an attempt to demonstrate that Leone harbored
animus toward his message, Galena points to Leone‟s reactions
to his comments during the Hearing of the Public portions of
previous Council meetings. Specifically, Galena testified that
on prior occasions when he spoke to the Council, Leone
scowled, grimaced, grinned, and “almost laugh[ed]” but Leone
did not have similar reactions when other persons spoke. App.
at 26-27.
Galena argues that the jury could have attributed an
improper motive to Leone because of his visible annoyance
when Galena called the Council members “tax spenders.”
Appellant‟s br. at 27-28. Galena also argues that Leone
channeled his frustrations with public comments at him and
suppressed his speech because Leone did not appreciate having
“his authority questioned.” Id. at 19-20. According to Galena,
Leone‟s comments on March 20 to the members of the public
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who had spoken during the Hearing of the Public, telling them
to “be careful” and that the Council is “tired of some of these
issues being brought up,” demonstrate that Leone was annoyed
by public comments at Council meetings. Id. at 12. Galena
further argues that the sheriff‟s report of the March 20 meeting
and the video of the confrontation between him and Leone show
that Leone was speaking in an elevated voice while Galena
remained calm during the incident. Galena maintains that the
jury, from observing the demeanors of both Leone and Galena
on videotape, reasonably could have concluded that Galena‟s
identity motivated Leone to have him removed from the
meeting. Id. at 21.
Like the District Court, we view Leone‟s behavior toward
Galena in light of other evidence presented at the trial that was
uncontroverted and unimpeached. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151,
120 S.Ct. at 2110 (applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 50, “the court should
give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as
that evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted
and unimpeached, at least to the extent that that evidence comes
from disinterested witnesses”) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). But even giving Galena the benefit of all
reasonable inferences, the evidence is insufficient to justify a
finding that it was animus toward Galena or his message that
motivated Leone when he had Galena removed from the
meeting.
According to his testimony, Galena spoke 14 or 15 times
during the Hearing of the Public portions of previous Council
meetings, sometimes critically of the Council‟s actions, without
interruption from Leone or any other member of the Council. In
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addition, the minutes of the March 20 Council meeting as well
as the minutes of a January 2, 2007 meeting of the Council show
that members of the public, during the Hearing of the Public
portion of Council meetings, criticized the Council without any
interruption from Leone or any of the other Council members.
Specifically, several individuals asserted that the Council was
breaking the law, as Galena did when he mentioned the
Sunshine Act when he objected on March 20. Indeed, as we
already have emphasized, one member of the public objected
without any adverse repercussions to the Council‟s procedure of
moving ordinances from the first reading to the second reading,
the same issue that Galena sought to raise on March 20, 2007.
Despite a history of Galena and other members of the
public speaking out and criticizing the Council, there is no
evidence that Leone or any other Council member attempted to
silence members of the public who were critical of the Council.
Although Leone chastised certain individuals at the March 20
meeting for what he considered their baseless accusations of
unlawful activity on the part of the Council, he did not rule them
out of order, prevent them from speaking, or have them ejected
from the meeting. In fact, as we discussed above, the other
members of the public who spoke at the Hearing of the Public
portion of the March 20 meeting criticized the Council more
harshly than Galena and addressed the same subject that Galena
sought to address in his subsequent objection without being
removed or having their speech suppressed.23 Further, as the
23

Indeed, it is questionable whether Galena‟s objection to the
procedure being followed may be characterized as a criticism of
Leone or the Council. Certainly courts do not regard objections
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District Court noted, there was no evidence that Leone
discriminated among members of the public in terms of how he
enforced the Administrative Code.
Ultimately, Galena‟s arguments, rather than showing that
Leone was biased against him or his viewpoint, starkly
demonstrate that the only difference between Galena and the
other members of the public who spoke out on March 20 was
the timing of their comments. Leone‟s reactions to Galena‟s
comments during the Hearing of the Public portions of past
Council meetings certainly can lead to the reasonable inference
that, at least on some occasions, Leone disagreed with Galena‟s
viewpoints. However, Leone ruled Galena out of order and had
him ejected from the meetings only when Galena spoke at a time
other than the Hearing of the Public portion of a Council
meeting. On the 14 or 15 other occasions when Galena voiced
his opinion, Leone, while sometimes disagreeing, did not
prevent Galena from delivering his message. Likewise, Leone‟s
comments to the members of the public in response to their
comments show that while he disagreed with their viewpoints,
he did not attempt to silence their speech during the time set
aside for public comments.24

to their rulings as criticisms of them personally.
24

The only Council minutes in the record other than those of the
March 20 meeting, those from the January 2, 2007 meeting,
show Leone making comments similar to those he made on
March 20 expressing disappointment with the tenor of public
comments. Apparently this back and forth is a regular scenario
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To the extent that this case involves restrictions
predicated on the timing of comments, the issue in this case is
remarkably similar to the issue that the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit considered in Kindt v. Santa Monica Rent Control
Bd., 67 F.3d 266 (9th Cir. 1995). The plaintiff in Kindt, Albert
Kindt, was a frequent participant in meetings of the Santa
Monica Rent Control Board. Id. at 267. At one time Board
regulations provided that members of the public who wished to
address the Board fill out slips of paper, or “chits,”
corresponding to the agenda item they sought to address. Id.
But because the public comments had become disruptive, the
Board switched to a system in which it allowed public
comments only during the last item of the agenda, Item 13. Id.
at 268. Kindt, however, continued to speak and loudly disrupt
Board meetings during portions of the meeting no longer open
to public comments and, on several occasions, the Board
removed him for disrupting the meeting. Id. at 268-69. Kindt
filed a civil rights action alleging that the Board conspired to
violate his First Amendment right to free speech by ejecting him
from public Board meetings and by discriminating between
speakers who supported their views and speakers who opposed
them. The District Court granted the Board summary judgment
and, following Kindt‟s appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Inasmuch as Kindt involves legal principles with respect
to the timing of comments similar to those implicated here,
at Council meetings: certain members of the public express
disappointment with the Council and Leone expresses his
disagreement with their comments.
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though Kindt‟s conduct was more egregious than Galena‟s, we
will quote the Court of Appeal‟s reasoning at length:
[Kindt] argues that because Item 13
matters occur at the end of the
meeting, he is „deprived of speech‟
because he has a smaller audience
by the time he is allowed to speak
and because he is not allowed more
than three minutes to respond to
longer presentations by speakers
who addressed the Board under
Item 4. Those facts do not establish
that Kindt‟s First Amendment
rights were violated. The Board
regulations restricting public
commentary to three minutes per
item at the end of each meeting are
the kind of reasonable time, place,
and manner restrictions that
preserve a board‟s legitimate
interest in conducting efficient,
orderly meetings. . . . No invidious
regulation of Kindt‟s speech was
implicated and content was not a
factor -- e.g., the fact that the
Board‟s views on the Cambodian
regime might or might not be
different from Kindt‟s was not the
point at all. Whether he wanted to
speak in favor of those views or
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against them, his chit had to be
heard under Item 13, which was the
time set aside for public comment
on all but such special matters as
public hearings (Item 7). In other
words, if the type of tangential
resolution in issue here was meant
to be covered by Rule 1024, the
vice is not that the Board failed to
hear public comment during the
part of the agenda given over to
„announcements, commendations,
award of service pins, introduction
of special guests,‟ Item 4, or the
„salute to the flag,‟ Item 1. The
vice is that the Board passed
resolutions before it heard from the
general public. That is not a
violation of the First Amendment.
Again, Kindt was not kept
from speaking because of the
content of his speech, but because
he submitted chits for items that
were not held open for public
commentary until Item 13 on the
agenda. When the Board heard
comments during Item 13, Kindt
was never denied an opportunity to
speak about any subject he wished.
In fact, several times he addressed
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personally derogatory remarks to
individual Board members and was
not silenced. Nor was he silenced
before his time expired. In general,
when Kindt was actually ejected
from the Board meetings he was
disrupting the proceedings by
yelling and trying to speak when it
was not time for an Item 13 matter.
The only exception was when the
ejection did not come until
sometime after he and his cohort
had disrupted a meeting, and the
Board had taken a break to let
things settle down. It appears that
as soon as the Board returned,
Kindt‟s cohort was seen to make an
obscene gesture toward a Board
member, which threatened to start
the disruption all over again. Those
were permissible removals within
the Board's regulation 1017
governing rules of decorum at
Board meetings.

Id. at 271 -272 (citations omitted) (first two emphases added and
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last emphasis in original).25
It is significant that the minutes of the meeting of January
2, 2007, when Galena spoke during the nonpublic comment
period, show that Leone merely called him out of order. So far
as minutes in the record reveal, no member of the public other
than Galena ever spoke out of the order for public comments set
forth in the Administrative Code.26 But on the occasion of
which we are aware when that happened, Leone was consistent
in his application of the Code‟s temporal restriction on public
comments. The only reasonable inference from this evidence is
that Leone prevented Galena from making comments regardless
of their content at a time that the Code‟s time, place, and manner
provisions restricted public comments. This case simply does
not involve suppression of speech based on the speaker‟s
viewpoints or identity and we will not repackage it so that it
becomes such a case.
The video and the sheriff‟s report shows that Leone was
upset and Galena was calm during the confrontation but nothing
more. Of course, we realize that in his brief Galena recites that
25

Though we reiterate that Galena‟s conduct surely was more
benign than Kindt‟s, that difference does not make the principles
of law that Kindt set forth with respect to a member of the
public speaking at a time not designated for that purpose any
less applicable here.
26

We, of course, recognize that it is entirely possible that at
meetings for which we do not have the minutes members of the
public spoke out of order.
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the audio and video recordings of the March 20 meeting show
that, as Galena “was escorted out,” Leone asked if “[a]nyone
else want[s] to go?” Appellant‟s br. at 21. But that comment,
though certainly impolitic, only shows Leone‟s intent to prevent
other members of the public from interrupting the Council
meeting in a similar manner at a time not provided for public
comments. Without supporting evidence, and there is none here,
the drawing of an inference that Leone harbored an animus
toward Galena because of his identity or the drawing of an
inference that the content of Galena‟s speech motivated Leone
to have him removed from the meeting “is not a reasonable
inference from the evidence but instead is a leap of faith.”
Northview Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 227 F.3d 78,
95 (3d Cir. 2000).27

27

We note that Judge Sloviter, in her dissent, compares the facts
of this case to the facts in Monteiro. We do not discuss that case
at length as the circumstances in that case were so different than
the facts here and the jury‟s finding of the defendant‟s
unconstitutional motive was unquestionably supported by a
legally sufficient evidentiary basis. Monteiro involved a dispute
between two council members over the City of Elizabeth‟s
annual budget. 436 F.3d at 400-01. The president of the
council, Perkins-Auguste, ejected Monteiro, another member of
the council, from a council meeting after Monteiro interrupted
Perkins-Auguste to defend himself from an ad hominem attack
Perkins-Auguste made on him. Id. at 405. We found that
“[w]hile Monteiro was arguably disrupting the proceedings by
interrupting her, he was also defending himself from a personal
attack. It was Perkins-Auguste who changed the tone of the
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Galena further argues that the state lawfully could impose
a restriction based on the content of his speech only if the
speech would cause public unrest. See Terminiello v. City of
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4, 69 S.Ct. 894, 896 (1949) (“[F]reedom of
speech, though not absolute, . . . is nevertheless protected
against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to
produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil
that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or
unrest.”). Galena reasons that inasmuch as his comments did
not create public unrest, Leone must have suppressed his speech
based on its content. The District Court thought that this line of
reasoning was flawed logically inasmuch as it begs the question
of whether, in giving effect to an otherwise legitimate time,
place, and manner regulation, Leone acted with the subjective
intent of suppressing speech.
Clearly, the Court reached the correct conclusion with
respect to the Terminiello issue. To start with, as we have
meeting from a debate about the merits of the budget to a quasiprosecutorial forum. . . .” Id. Thus, the circumstances of that
case, which involved a debate between two council members,
were different from the circumstances here, where a member of
the public interrupted a council meeting at a time that was not
set aside for public comments. Further, unlike in Monteiro,
where the jury plausibly could infer that Perkins-Auguste had an
unconstitutional reason for removing Monteiro predicated on
their confrontation over the budget, as we have explained there
is no basis to infer that Leone had an unconstitutional motive in
removing Galena as he did not know the content of Galena‟s
objection when he ruled him out of order.
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emphasized, the restriction on speech was based on its timing,
not its content. Furthermore, the enforcement, no matter how
justified, of any restriction on speech, necessarily suppresses
speech at the time it is enforced. Thus, if a member of the
public at the Hearing of the Public portion of a Council meeting
wanted to discuss his child‟s birthday party, the proposed
speech, though not presenting a danger to anyone, would be so
far removed from the business of the meeting, or the Council‟s
or County‟s business in general, that the chairperson could
suppress the speech without raising First Amendment issues.
See Eichenlaub, 385 F.3d at 281.
Finally, Galena‟s contention that he was not creating a
disturbance, at least as that term is ordinarily understood, by
objecting to the Council‟s procedures, even if factually accurate,
does not change our result. If even only one member of the
public objects during a time when public comments are not
allowed the Council‟s procedure in conducting business is
affected even if the member of the public interrupts the meeting
in a conversational, nonthreatening tone of voice. The
interruption of the order of business is itself the disturbance.28
28

Thus, this case is distinguishable from Norse v. City of Santa
Cruz, 629 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), where a
governmental entity removed a member of the public from a
public meeting for disagreeing without disrupting the meeting.
In Norse, the Santa Cruz City Council ejected a member of the
public from a Council meeting after he gave the Council a silent
Nazi salute. Id. at 970. The Court rejected the City‟s argument
that the City could remove those members of the public who
made silent, non-disruptive gestures because members of the
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See e.g., Kindt, 67 F.3d at 271 (upholding the ejection of a
spectator from a public meeting because he was “disrupting the
proceedings by yelling and trying to speak when it was not time
for” public comments).
It is, of course, appropriate for us to consider how
exempting all members of the public, and not just Galena, from
the protocol confining comments to the Public Hearing portion
of meetings would affect the functioning of the County Council.
See Heffron, 452 U.S. at 654, 101 S.Ct. at 2567 (holding that
state supreme court erred by failing to consider how granting all
groups, and not just plaintiffs, an exemption from the
government regulation would affect the State‟s interest of
maintaining order at the state fair). Joseph Giles, a Council
member, testified that “for the sake of the common good and for
the sake of the order of the business of the meeting,” the
Council must remove persons who do not go through the normal
process to address the Council. App. at 62-63. Regardless of
how the Pennsylvania General Assembly supplemented free
public forfeited all First Amendment rights once the public
comment period ended. Id. at 976; Id. at 979 (Kozinski, C.J.,
concurring) (“Even in a limited public forum like a city council
meeting, the First Amendment tightly constrains the
government‟s power; speakers may be removed only if they are
actually disruptive.”). But Norse, unlike this case, did not
involve a situation in which the speaker injected himself into a
public meeting at a time not provided for public participation by
attempting to speak. In Norse the City removed the member of
the public for giving the salute, not for giving it at the wrong
time.
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speech rights when it enacted the Sunshine Act, the First
Amendment simply does not require that all members of the
public be permitted to voice objections to the Council‟s
procedures any time they desire to do so.
We also point out that the District Court, without
objection from Galena, presented the case to the jury under
instructions that made the question of whether Galena was
creating a disturbance on March 20, 2007, irrelevant to the
issues on this appeal. The Court told the jury to answer the
question of whether Leone had Galena removed from the
meeting with the intention of imposing reasonable restrictions
on the time, place and manner of his speech so as to preserve the
order and decorum of the meeting or whether Leone had him
ejected based on Galena‟s message or identity. This instruction
did not inject a disturbance issue into the jury‟s consideration.
Accordingly, this case is simply not a case in which the Court
was dealing with a content-based restriction, the validity of
which would depend on whether the speech, unless suppressed,
might create a disturbance or cause unrest.
Clearly, the evidence required that the jury conclude that
Leone was enforcing time, place and manner restrictions.
Inasmuch as the restriction was reasonable and the evidence
required a finding that Leone had the intent to enforce it without
regard for whether Galena was creating a disturbance, the Court
correctly granted Leone judgment as a matter of law as the
propriety of the enforcement of the restrictions did not depend
on whether Galena was creating a disturbance. Indeed, Galena
does not even contend in his brief that he objected when the
Court did not charge the jury that should determine whether
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Galena had been creating a disturbance. Thus, we are not
concerned with an issue similar to the issue the Supreme Court
faced in Terminiello.

V. CONCLUSION
In sum, an analysis of all of the evidence in the record
with regard to the March 20 confrontation demonstrates that
Leone was enforcing a reasonable time, place, and manner
restriction on Galena‟s speech designed to ensure that the
Council functioned for its intended purpose: i.e., being the
legislative body of Erie County. Like the District Court, we
cannot find evidence in the record to support a reasonable
inference that Leone ejected Galena from the March 20 Council
meeting because of animus toward him or his message nor can
we find evidence that Galena did not have an adequate
alternative opportunity to state his objections to the Council‟s
procedures. Therefore, the Court properly vacated the jury
verdict and granted Leone‟s motion for judgment as a matter of
law. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court‟s orders of
March 5, 2010, vacating the jury verdict, granting judgment as a
matter of law in favor of Leone, and denying Galena‟s motions
for attorney‟s fees and costs.
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Daniel T. Galena v. Fiore Leone, No. 10-1914
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
My colleagues have presented a learned exegesis on
First Amendment law which, if raised in a pretrial context,
may well carry the day. I differ because they fail (in my
opinion) to give sufficient weight to yet another constitutional
imperative – that grounded in the Seventh Amendment which
requires judges to give higher weight to a jury’s interpretation
to the facts than to their own predilections.
In this case, they affirm the District Court’s bold step
overturning the jury’s verdict for allegedly insufficient
evidence. I respectfully dissent. Drawing all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, as is required, I
believe the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s
conclusion that Fiore Leone, the chairman of the Erie County
Council, was motivated more by the content of Daniel
Galena’s speech and/or his identity than by a desire to enforce
a reasonable regulation. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149-50 (2000).
Although Galena may have been speaking out of turn
when he objected to the March 20, 2007 proceedings as
violating the Pennsylvania Sunshine Act, it is undisputed that
Leone’s reaction was extremely angry, indeed
disproportionately so. Meanwhile, Galena remained calm
throughout. Even the police officer who escorted Galena
from the meeting testified that Leone was ―pretty animated . .
. pounding the gavel,‖ while Galena was ―pretty calm
throughout the whole ordeal.‖ App. at 56. Another
councilmember described the exchange as ―boisterous,‖ but
said that Galena was not insulting, threatening, insolent,
slanderous, or obscene. Finally, Galena testified that Leone
responded in a ―loud, angry tone.‖ App. at 38. Although a
jury would not be required to credit Galena’s testimony, it
certainly was entitled to. Even if the jury chose to ignore
Galena’s testimony, the other testimony was consistent that
Leone reacted in a loud, angry manner to Galena’s untimely
objection. The videotape of the exchange, which was played
for the jury, supports that testimony. Leone’s

disproportionate reaction gives rise to an inference that it was
precipitated by something other than Galena’s miscue.
This conclusion is supported by our precedent. In
Monteiro v. City of Elizabeth, 436 F.3d 397 (3d Cir. 2006),
we held that the District Court properly denied judgment as a
matter of law when the defendant presiding officer removed
another councilperson from a meeting. In that case, as here,
the plaintiff councilperson was interrupting the presiding
officer and there was a valid time, place, and manner speech
restriction in effect. Id. at 403-05. Notwithstanding, because
the presiding officer responded in an emotionally charged,
angry way and with personal attacks against the other
councilperson, we held that a reasonable jury could find that
the officer was motivated by the plaintiff’s speech or identity,
not by a desire to enforce the otherwise valid regulation. Id.
at 405. We also held that ―[t]he speed with which [the
presiding officer] determined to eject [the plaintiff] from the
meeting . . . could be viewed by a reasonable jury as
evidence‖ that the officer was motivated by content and
personal animosity, rather than a desire to maintain decorum.
Id.
Though the evidence of the presiding officer’s illmotive was perhaps stronger in Monteiro than it is here,
Monteiro reinforces that the jury was entitled to infer from
Leone’s anger and the speed with which he silenced Galena
that he was impermissibly motivated. Despite the factual
similarity between Monteiro and this case, the majority does
not persuasively distinguish its outcome.
So swift was Leone’s retribution that Galena was
hardly able to articulate the substance of his objection. The
majority characterizes Leone’s immediate sanction as
evidence that the content of the speech did not motivate
Leone. While that is one way to view the evidence, that is
certainly not the only way. The jury could have reasonably
inferred, as we held in Monteiro, that Leone acted swiftly
because he knew, even if not the specific terms, at least the
general tenor of Galena’s objection and attempted to
preemptively silence him. Such an inference is reasonable
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given that Galena had been a frequent commentator at
meetings, often raising arguments that Leone himself
characterized as being criticisms of the council. See App. at
75 (Leone testified that Galena had previously criticized him
for acting ―illegal[ly], as far as some of the issues were
concerned, [Galena] said that a few times when he addressed
Council.‖). Even were such an inference not reasonable, the
First Amendment protects restrictions based on the speaker’s
identity; without question Leone knew that Galena was the
speaker.
Other evidence also supports the jury’s verdict. For
example, as outlined by the majority, after the public hearing
portion of the March 20 meeting had concluded, Leone
ominously warned three of the citizens who had spoken to be
careful when they accused the council of breaking the law
and commented ―[i]t seems like no matter what, some people
cannot be pleased.‖ App. at 144-45. Leone then warned
people to ―be careful, because, if necessary, Council will take
the matter to court.‖ App. at 145. This warning appears to be
content based—Leone was tired of being accused by
constituents of breaking the law and threatened to take them
to court if they continued to do so. It is hardly a comment
one would expect from a neutral presider.
The jury could have reasonably concluded that when
Leone silenced Galena, Leone was grouping him with the
other constituents whom he had first threatened. The jury
could have viewed Leone’s conduct as motivated by his
anticipation that Galena’s speech would be critical of him.
As noted, Leone testified that in the past Galena had accused
him of acting illegally, the same type of accusation that
prompted Leone to issue his warning on March 20, 2007.
Indeed, on March 20 Galena was again accusing Leone of
acting ultra vires, in contravention of the Pennsylvania
Sunshine Law (an objection which, according to the
transcript, Galena was barely able to utter before he was
ejected). See App. at 148. Additional evidence indicating
that Leone was grouping Galena with the other constituents is
the fact that as Galena was being escorted out of the room,
Leone shouted, asking ―Anyone else want to go?‖ See
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Galena v. Leone, 711 F. Supp. 2d 440, 447 (W.D. Pa. 2010).
The majority opinion does not discuss this fact.
The fact that Leone threatened Galena with
―harassment‖ charges as he ejected Galena, ostensibly
because Galena accused the council of acting illegally, further
supports the jury’s conclusion that Leone was motivated by
the content of Galena’s speech. At trial, Leone attempted to
explain this threat away, testifying that he more or less meant
―disorderly conduct.‖ App. at 110. But the jury was not
required to credit that explanation. As the factfinder charged
with making credibility determinations, it appears they did
not. The Supreme Court has instructed that we are not to
second guess such credibility determinations. Reeves, 530
U.S. at 150.
On that same note, the majority appears to credit
Leone’s testimony that he was merely enforcing a provision
of the Erie Administrative Code, which he understood to
allow public participation only during the public hearing
portion of the meeting. However, as outlined above, there are
numerous facts—Leone’s anger, swift response, and contentbased threats—from which a jury could have rejected Leone’s
testimony and concluded that procedural stewardship was not
his motive.
Finally, the majority emphasizes that Galena had
spoken at meetings many times in the past, and Leone had,
for the most part, allowed him and other persistent objectors
to speak. Viewed in this light, this historical relationship is
helpful for Leone. But the history reveals another side.
Namely, Leone had a track record of reacting negatively
towards Galena: scowling, grimacing, and laughing at
Galena’s comments. Notwithstanding Leone’s failure to have
silenced Galena in the past, the jury could have inferred from
Leone’s past behavior that he had a growing disdain for
Galena and his comments. The jury could have concluded
that the disdain reached a boiling point at the March 20, 2007
meeting and that Leone silenced Galena because of the
content of his speech and/or his identity.
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In sum, the jury was entitled to conclude that Leone
was motivated impermissibly by Galena’s speech content
and/or his identity. We should be hesitant to override the
jury’s judgment with our own. I would affirm the jury
verdict.
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